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‘Money itself discriminates’:  
Obstetric emergencies in the time of liberalisation 
 
Patricia Jeffery and Roger Jeffery 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Citizenship rights in India are being transformed under economic liberalisation. In this paper, 
we use obstetric crises to provide an entry point to explore recent changes in people’s access to 
health care and their understandings of their civic rights and entitlements. We draw on our 
research in rural Bijnor district (Uttar Pradesh) between 1982 and 2005. Over this period, the 
state has increasingly failed to provide a safety net of emergency obstetric care. Poor villagers 
seeking institutional deliveries in private facilities face either exclusion or indebtedness. 
Moreover, ‘consumers’ have no capacity to regulate the quality of private health care 
provision—but nor do the state or civil society organisations. Villagers critique the state’s 
failure to provide the health care that they regard as the citizen’s entitlement. Yet the health care 
market is accorded no greater legitimacy by its ‘customers’. Far from providing opportunities 
for empowerment, then, changes in health care provision serve to disempower the poor and to 
reduce the moral authority of both state and market. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
I 
Introduction 
In this paper, we explore the impact of India’s economic liberalisation on people’s access to 
health care and their understandings of their rights and entitlements as citizens. Among other 
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things, economic liberalisation has entailed retrenchment of the state’s contribution to providing 
public goods and increasing marketisation and commodification of many aspects of social and 
economic life. Alongside these changes, the World Bank and other proponents of liberalisation 
advocate individual self-regulation and personal responsibility, rather than reliance on service 
provision and overt regulation by the state. With respect to health care, these changes are marked 
by increasing privatisation of service provision and by efforts to legitimise the requirement that 
individuals take greater responsibility for their own health care. Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh sets the tone: basic health care should be accessible to everyone, regardless of purchasing 
power—but it is unreasonable to expect the state apparatus to carry the entire load:  
Many people talk in terms of the role of the state as providing vital entitlements; 
entitlements in many ways operate as dole outs. I am not saying that people are not 
entitled to certain basic services that the state must provide. But I believe [that] in a 
country as large as ours we must think of the empowerment of the people. Enabling 
people to help themselves to realise their vast latent development potential is far more 
important. So I place more emphasis on empowerment than entitlement. … 
Empowerment can motivate people to take charge of their own well-being, whereas 
entitlement perpetuates the relationship of the government as the sole benefactor for the 
people, who are passive recipients (Singh 2002: 25). 
Whilst he did not suggest how people would become empowered, the Prime Minister did 
admit that liberalisation has not generated enough resources for the provision of basic health care 
by the state, and that markets are not good at delivering it either. In this paper, we focus on the 
care that women in rural north India obtain during ‘obstetric emergencies’ in order to examine 
the implications of these inadequacies at the local level for the legitimacy of the state and other 
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significant social institutions, especially the market in health care. We draw on our research in 
Bijnor district (in western Uttar Pradesh) which has both predated and followed the 1992 
reforms.  
Bijnor district’s northern border is the Himalayan foothills, and its western border is 
marked by the River Ganges. Bijnor town, the district headquarters, had a population of some 
100,000 in 2001. Land in the district is fertile when irrigated and agriculture has been 
transformed since the introduction of Green Revolution packages since the mid-1960s. But 
landholdings are inequitable and generally small: most holdings are no more than 0.4-0.8 
hectares, and many households own no land at all. Wheat and rice are mostly cultivated for home 
consumption. The main cash crop is sugarcane, grown even by some small peasant households, 
and the district’s industrial activities are largely oriented around sugar processing. The people we 
describe in this paper are mainly small peasant farmers and households that are land-poor or 
landless, people who have been heavily engaged in the market for agricultural produce, 
employment, consumption goods etc. for many years. In 1982-3, we were based in two adjacent 
villages, Dharmnagri (a Hindu and Scheduled Caste village) and Jhakri (a Muslim village), about 
5 km from Bijnor town, and we returned there several times over the following two decades for 
further research. Our first project concerned the social organisation of childbearing, a theme we 
focused on again during further research in 2003-5. 1  
Maternal mortality accounts for only a minority of deaths of women in the reproductive 
years, yet it has an iconic status in India and elsewhere. At the global level, reducing maternal 
                                                 
1 Our village data include household censuses, maternity histories for all ever-married women, in-depth focus on 
about forty key informant couples, and discussions ranging over birth accounts, health care, etc. Named individuals 
have pseudonyms and the quotations are our own translations. For more on our earlier research, see Jeffery et al. 
(1989). 
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mortality ratios by three quarters between 1990 and 2015 is one of the Millennium Development 
Goals, whilst the provision of ‘emergency obstetric care’ has been central in policy rhetoric in 
India. In most developing countries, indeed, reducing maternal mortality is considered a key task 
for publicly-provided health care services. At the village level, maternal mortality is always 
tragic for the families involved, whether for orphaned older children or because of the 
indebtedness generated by expenditures that ultimately proved futile. Even near-deaths become 
general talking points, the crucial events being mulled over and repeated, sometimes until they 
achieve mythic qualities. During our first research in rural Bijnor, most women we talked to had 
relatives—mothers, sisters, cousins—who had died in childbirth. Pregnant women often 
expressed acute anxieties that something might go awry during their imminent labour.  In rural 
Bijnor, most women deliver at home. Institutional deliveries have increased, however, from 
under 1 per cent of the pregnancies in Dharmnagri and Jhakri in 1973-82 (4 out of 449), to 
almost 9 per cent (54 out of 620) in 1993-2002, a level comparable to the overall figure for rural 
UP of around 11 per cent (Mishra 2005: 66). Women’s accounts indicate that almost all these 
institutional deliveries were undertaken reluctantly. Several women would probably have died 
but for the care they eventually received. Notably, all but two of the institutional deliveries in the 
recent period involved admission to private nursing homes in Bijnor town, rather than the 
government hospital. In part, this is simply because private health care provision has expanded 
since the 1980s.  
The neo-liberal discourses associated with economic liberalisation imply that new kinds 
of citizens will be constituted, citizens who would no longer look to the state for services and 
support, but who would be autonomous, self-reliant and responsible consumers.  Such citizen-
consumers would embrace the reforms that empower them to exercise informed choices and 
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participate in the marketplace, and would be energetic and entrepreneurial in shopping around, 
for instance, for appropriate health care (see Rose 1999). In several ways, however, this 
seemingly optimistic formulation masks processes that are rather less than benign. First, the 
central presumption of equal market power belies the systemic inequalities on the global stage 
(Sparke 2006). Countries in the global South are subject to the hierarchical ‘supra-national 
governmental regime’, but also to the ‘international regime of development’ (as embodied in the 
Bretton Woods institutions, for instance). Agendas generated in the global North tend to 
compromise the social rights of citizenship—such as access to health care—that had been 
established in many places in the global North but which had been scarcely met, if at all, in the 
global South (Hindess 2002). The playing field within India, though, is no more level than it is in 
the global arena. Thus, it is also vital to attend to local specificities and explore how macro-level 
economic reforms and the meta-narratives of neo-liberalism play out within inequitable social 
and economic power structures on the ground (Sparke 2006). Moreover, the filtering of the 
discourses of neo-liberalism through real institutions can also permit slippage between the 
intentions and the effects of neo-liberal reforms and may allow some space for contestation and 
subversion at the local level (Haney 2008).  
Within India, for instance, the Uttar Pradesh (UP) government has been the recipient of 
two World Bank loans dating from 2000 that have affected the health sector: the Fiscal Reform 
and Public Sector Restructuring Programme that required a 2 per cent per annum cut in public 
employment, and the UP Health Systems Development Project which, amongst other things, 
pushes towards public-private partnerships in health care provision. Such restructuring of health 
care differentially affects the citizens of UP who are located in diverse structures of inequality 
and have highly varied experiences of the increasing marketisation of health care provision. 
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Undoubtedly, it poses relatively few problems for the wealthy or well connected who can pay for 
services rendered, and for medical practitioners who can take advantage of the new spaces for 
private health care and who (as providers) have the capacity to extract payment for those 
services. It is far from clear, however, that poor rural women and their kin can weather obstetric 
emergencies better than previously. 2 Rather, most villagers in western UP cannot be autonomous 
neo-liberal consumers. They are hard pressed to pay for the health care they obtain from private 
providers and their engagement with the health care market all too often results not in 
empowerment but in further indebtedness and impoverishment. In the context of widespread 
poverty, the state’s failure to provide even the safety net of emergency obstetric care can have 
disastrous implications for household finances and wellbeing. Moreover, the changes associated 
with economic liberalisation mean that quality of provision cannot be assured: the state has little 
capacity to render the health care market accountable, and civil society organisations or patients 
and their families are neither competent nor well-placed to do this themselves (a point that also 
applies to other aspects of the state’s activities: see Drèze and Sen 2002: 363-75). Villagers are, 
moreover, generally well aware of many of these issues. They mount critiques of the state’s 
failure to provide the health care that they consider to be the citizen’s entitlement. The state’s 
increasing marginality in people’s repertoire of health care options undermines its moral 
authority, yet they do not buy into the marketisation of health care either: the health care market 
is accorded no greater legitimacy by its ‘customers’. Indeed, the health care market is regarded 
as an ambiguous saviour, at best, and villagers comment adversely that private health care 
provision is a ‘business’ and not the service it should be.  
 
                                                 
2 We cannot address here the effects of gender, caste and communal politics on these issues.  
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II 
Economic liberalisation and health care 
Although the Indian government formally adopted a programme of structural adjustment only in 
1992, state-funded biomedical health care services in UP—particularly in rural areas—were 
notoriously under-funded and woefully inadequate well before then. The urban bias in provision 
during the colonial period was not remedied by independent India’s ‘developmental’ state in the 
1950s and 1960s (Jeffery 1988).3 The 1978 Alma Ata proclamation of ‘Health for All by the 
Year 2000’ advocated ‘comprehensive primary health care (PHC)’ to address rural health needs 
worldwide. But comprehensive PHC faltered almost immediately: by the early 1980s, ‘selective’ 
programmes (e.g. malaria control) replaced ‘comprehensive’ ones. Such ‘vertical’ programmes, 
however, have been widely criticised as donor-driven; as unsustainable because of reliance on 
external funding; as piecemeal, single-issue technical-fixes of debatable cost-effectiveness; and 
as detached from the regular health care system rather than embedded in social, economic and 
political contexts or linking public health measures to curative health care (e.g. Freedman, et al. 
2005:36-45; Qadeer 2003). This general failure to provide comprehensive primary health care 
was true for UP (and elsewhere in India).  
The roots of liberalisation can be traced to excessive lending by Northern banks flush 
with oil money in the mid-1970s. Many countries in the global South became seriously indebted. 
From the early 1980s onwards, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were introduced in 
many countries in the global South to eradicate balance of payments problems through drastic 
changes in economic policies. Advocates of SAPs considered that state provisions were costly 
                                                 
3 This section draws more generally on several of the sources cited in the text as well as on Drèze and Sen (2002: 
208-213); Jesani (2003); Karlekar (2003: 117 ff). 
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and inefficient, so state responsibilities and budgets should be reduced, and that market 
competition should be encouraged. They did not see health care as a need, right or social good to 
be catered to by the state, and they were happy for the state sector to be residualised. Rather, they 
saw health care as a demand emanating from individuals, a commodity that should largely be 
met by the market.  
Even by the early 1990s, though, reports of the detrimental and ramifying effects of SAPs 
(particularly on women and the poor) were coming from many places that had adopted SAPs in 
the 1980s (see Afshar and Dennis 1992; Commonwealth Secretariat 1989; Cornia et al. 1987 and 
1988; Sparr 1994; World Development 1991; World Development 1995). In response, the World 
Bank retreated slightly: public sector health care would be a safety net or gap-filler offering 
those aspects of health care that the market could not or would not provide (the so-called ‘market 
failures’). The subtitle of the 1993 Development Report—Investing in Health—captures the 
continuing preference for the supposed benefits of ‘market efficiency’ and ‘customer’ 
satisfaction, however (World Bank 1993; see Rao 1999a for an extended critique with respect to 
India).  
Despite the criticisms levelled at SAPs, then, liberalisation in India during the 1990s 
affected state health systems and their budgets (Dev and Mooij 2005; Mishra 2005; Qadeer et al. 
2001a; Rao 1999a; Sen et al. 2002). During this period, the states came under an increasing 
financial squeeze: their allocation to health care declined substantially and there was a relative 
shift of state health resources away from primary health care. Central government allocations to 
the social sector as a whole continued to increase during the 1990s, although more slowly than in 
the previous decade and heavily buttressed by external funding; and the central government’s 
percentage share of total health sector allocations increased in comparison with the states. Thus 
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we have the apparently paradoxical situation that central funding in state health budgets showed 
a relative increase even though central funding itself declined. The overall decline in allocations 
to the social sector was uneven around the country, with the poorer states (already with weak 
social sector provision) being worst affected (Rao 1999b). UP is either the lowest or in the 
bottom three of larger Indian states in any comparison of the value and poverty-related public 
expenditures on health (Mishra 2005: 76-77). In UP, per capita public expenditure on health in 
1999-2000 was only about 85 per cent (in real terms) of that in 1990-91 (Dev and Mooij 2005: 
102). Declining health sector allocations disproportionately favoured urban areas and family 
welfare (family planning) (Mishra 2005: 76). In the social sector as a whole, staff salaries 
accounted for over 90 per cent of expenditures (Dev and Mooij 2005: 104-105) yet many posts 
remained unfilled: for instance, 82 per cent of obstetric and gynaecology posts in UP were vacant 
in 1992 (Sen, et al. 2002: 293). Subsequently, there were drastic cuts in investment in new clinics 
and hospital infrastructures and in maintenance budgets, and steep declines in staff recruitment to 
expand provision or simply to replace staff who retired. In poorer states such as UP, cuts in 
government services disproportionately affect poor people who generally rely more heavily on 
the state for in-patient and curative care (Baru 1998: 63, 86). The UP state sector has never 
flourished sufficiently to meet the health care needs of the major portion of the population. Thus, 
rather than heralding a sea-change, funding shortfalls to the state system during the 1990s further 
compromised a health care system that was already severely hobbled by inadequate funding. 
Viewed from another direction, health care provision in India has always been a ‘mixed 
economy’, in which private practitioners—with various levels of training or none—provided 
some health care. Even in 1946, 73 per cent of allopathic doctors practised privately, although 
the private sector expanded from the late 1970s in particular (Baru 1998: 46). Already facing a 
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debt crisis in the early 1980s, the government Statement on Health Policy (Government of India 
1982) talked of further opening up health care to non-governmental players. The private sector, 
though, expanded only partly because of the debt crisis and the subsequent structural adjustment 
liberalisation: bank nationalisation and the state sector’s failure to increase provision in line with 
population growth created spaces into which private practitioners could move (Baru 1998: 150 
ff.). By the 1990s, many commentators were remarking upon the increasing salience of private 
practitioners in catering to many needs that might otherwise have been provided by the state, an 
uneven march of privatisation and commercialisation consonant with World Bank orthodoxy. 
Private practitioners established clinics where they could expect a reliable income, which tended 
to be in more wealthy states, and urban and suburban areas (Baru 1999; Chakraborty 2002). 
Generally, they offered only out-patient care or in-patient care in small nursing homes. By the 
mid-1980s, there were high rates of utilisation, especially in the wealthier states (Baru 1999), 
although 80 per cent of in-patient care was still obtained in the state sector (Krishnan 1999: 209 
ff.). According to NSS figures, by 1995-96 the private sector was providing over 80 per cent of 
out-patient care and nearly 60 per cent of in-patient care. By 2000, public expenditures on health 
in India were markedly lower than elsewhere, but private expenditures—at 4 per cent of GDP—
greatly exceeded those in most other developing countries (Dev and Mooij 2005: 102-03). 
Indeed, the World Bank report entitled India: Private Health Services for the Poor comments: 
‘In the poorer states such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the public sector is completely 
dysfunctional and there are no effective alternatives to the private sector’ (Radwan et al. 2004: 
13). 
  
III 
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Liberalisation in local practice 
The government dispensary in Dharmnagri is the locally visible face of declining state 
investment in health services. Established in the 1950s through the patronage of the dominant 
local landowner, the buildings were dilapidated and mildew-encrusted even by the early 1980s. 
The operating theatre was last used during the sterilisation drive in the Emergency of 1975-7 and 
it has remained locked ever since—apart from serving as our somewhat less than bijou residence 
in 1982-3. The maternal and child health clinic built during the 1980s has been used as a polling 
booth and a residence, but not for its intended purpose. A post-partum building constructed with 
World Bank funds has never been unlocked and used. Doctors posted to the dispensary prefer to 
live in Bijnor town rather than in their official residence on the compound, which has a leaking 
roof, broken windows and rotten shutters. The fabric of the other buildings is similarly ill-kempt. 
For several years, patients had to skirt round the boughs of a fallen tree resting on the veranda of 
the main clinic building. Scarcely legible advertisements about tuberculosis (TB) treatments and 
the virtues of family planning adorn the walls, whilst a rusty notice proclaims ‘first a latrine, then 
a daughter-in-law’. The open areas between the buildings contain a dense growth of weeds 
(mainly marijuana). Despite readily-accessible ground water, plumbing is non-existent, and a 
disused well and several hand-pumps are dotted around the compound. Electricity supplies to the 
village are erratic and the dispensary has no back-up facilities. Indeed, when we were living 
there in 1990-1, the power lines were disconnected by the State electricity board because the bills 
had not been paid for several years. There are no autoclaves and no means of ensuring a cold 
chain for vaccines (for UP more generally, see Drèze and Sen 2002: 201 ff.). 
Even in the early 1980s, rather than seeking medical care from the government 
dispensary, patients from Dharmnagri and Jhakri often obtained advice and treatment for their 
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ailments from private practitioners. In 1982, there were three or four male practitioners at a 
crossroads about 1 km from Dharmnagri. Several of the government dispensary staff (illegally) 
offered medical care on a private basis. Going further afield was difficult, however, as the 
villages had very poor transport services. Thus, people mainly sought medical treatment for 
intractable and chronic problems (infertility, repeated miscarriages, TB, kidney stones) rather 
than for medical emergencies (such as obstructed labour or accidents).   
By 2002, however, around a dozen independent medical practitioners—all men—were 
running small enterprises from roadside kiosks in the locality (see Pinto 2004 for an account of 
private practitioners elsewhere in rural UP; Rohde and Vishwanathan 1995). Most possess no 
recognised credentials in any of India’s medical systems (biomedical, homeopathic, ayurvedic or 
unani). Bhagats and maulwis also offer treatments. Few of these local private practitioners 
provide in-patient care. Further, they generally prescribe biomedical remedies (often by 
injection) (as is common elsewhere: Sen et al. 2002: 296). In addition, access to Bijnor town is 
much easier nowadays and there has been a significant expansion in the numbers of non-state 
health practitioners, clinics and nursing homes there. In 1982, just two private nursing homes 
dealt with maternity cases, in addition to the dilapidated government women’s hospital. By 1990, 
a large new government district hospital had opened on the outskirts of Bijnor town. By 2002, 
the town also boasted 20 nursing homes with in-patient maternity care, around 30 ultra-sound 
centres (probably used mainly for foetal sex-determination), other diagnostic services and 
countless private practitioners offering out-patient services. Most nursing homes are small-scale: 
9 have fewer than 15 beds, only 2 have as many as 30, most of the remainder had 15-20, not all 
for maternity cases. Upper-caste urban-educated Hindu doctors dominate the private biomedical 
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health care sector in Bijnor town.4 In obstetrics and gynaecology, the doctors are all women. 
Married couples often run clinics and nursing homes together, providing maternity care, care 
related to the husband’s speciality, and stores selling pharmaceuticals. Since the early 1980s, 
then, the number of non-state urban facilities offering inpatient care has increased substantially. 
 
IV 
Rural women, urban delivery 
For several decades, high levels of maternal mortality in the global South have figured, often 
centrally, in global policy discourses. Various programmes have been devised to remedy the 
situation, although their success has been very uneven. During the late 1970s, training 
programmes for traditional birth attendants (TBAs, known as dais in north India) were favoured, 
whilst from 1987, programmes for ‘Safe Motherhood’ were being developed. At the 1994 
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, safety in pregnancy and 
childbirth was encompassed by a broader concept: Reproductive Health. Maternal mortality was 
to be halved by the decade of 1990-2000 and halved again by 2015. Some saw the twenty-year 
‘Program of Action’ as a new paradigm (McIntosh and Finkle 1995). Yet it had been framed 
within the neo-liberal agenda and critics soon suggested that the admirable aim of empowering 
women would be countermanded by the disempowering effects of SAPs (Petchesky 1995). 
Numerous reviews prepared for ‘Cairo +5’ indicated that achievements fell far short of the goals 
(e.g. Development 1999). 
                                                 
4 In Andhra Pradesh, upper castes predominated amongst private practitioners: they were mainly from landowning 
families that had benefited from the Green Revolution, could not invest in more land because of land ceiling 
legislation and diversified in various ways, including educating their children (Baru 1998: 156-58).  
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By the end of the 1990s, it was clear that maternal mortality ratios, far from being halved, 
were no longer declining. Recognising that most maternal deaths can be prevented, the 
Millennium Development Goals include the ambition to reduce maternal mortality by three-
quarters by 2015 (i.e. to the same level as projected in the ICPD Program of Action). Current 
policy discourse advocates ‘essential obstetric care’ (including ‘skilled’ attendants, widely 
available cheap and low-tech deliveries, preferably within the ‘safe’ management of biomedical 
institutions), with the back-up of comprehensive (or emergency) obstetric care (operating 
facilities, blood for transfusion etc.) and a functioning referral system (see, for instance, Berer 
and Ravindran 1999; Freedman et al. 2005: especially 77-94, 132-135; Maine 1999; World 
Health Organisation 1999).5 
Between 1982 and 1993, maternal mortality in India generally accounted for around 12-
14 per cent of deaths of women in the reproductive ages (15-44) (Qadeer 1998). During the 
1990s, overall maternal and neo-natal morbidity and mortality ratios in India at best plateaued, at 
worst increased (Ved and Dua 2005). In 2000, for instance, between 115,000 and 170,000 
maternal deaths occurred in India—about one-quarter of all maternal deaths worldwide 
(Freedman et al. 2005; Freedman et al. 2004). Maternal mortality ratios in UP remain 
disproportionately high: they were estimated to be about 900-950 deaths per 100,000 live births 
in the early 1980s; they appear to have declined during the period 1987-96, but only to between 
700 and 750 (Mari Bhat 2001). Such statistics imply between 35,000 and 40,000 maternal deaths 
in UP every year (Dasgupta 2004). Many more times that number suffer serious episodes of 
                                                 
5 The targets relate to the widely accepted claim that about 80 per cent of maternal deaths occur because of obstetric 
crises that neither TBA-training programmes nor increased ante-natal monitoring predict. The focus on essential and 
emergency obstetric care, however, echoes the technical focus of ‘vertical’ programmes and detaches maternal 
mortality from its socio-economic context (e.g. Qadeer 1998).  
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morbidity during or after pregnancy (Jain and Parasuraman 2004).  
In response to criticisms of SAPs, the World Bank became a major lender for health 
sector activities in many places during the 1990s—but mainly in ‘vertical’ programmes. In India, 
within the general trend of cuts in health sector budgets, central government allocations for 
Maternal and Child Health (renamed Reproductive and Child Health in 1997) grew from 5 to 15 
per cent of total health and family welfare allocations between 1992-3 and 2002-3 (Dev and 
Mooij 2005: 100). This, however, masks the prioritisation of rural family planning (whose 
budget doubled, and grew from 17 to 25 per cent of total expenditures), despite the publicity 
surrounding Reproductive and Child Health in general (Qadeer 1998). In theory, the 
Reproductive and Child Health programme emphasises staff training, enhanced ante-natal, intra-
partum and post-natal care, ‘skilled’ attendance at deliveries, strengthened emergency obstetric 
care and improved primary referral facilities. Initially, the programme had ambitious (and 
unrealistic) aims—100 per cent of deliveries with skilled attendance and reducing maternal 
deaths to 100 per 100,000 live births by 2010, later adjusted to 80 per cent of deliveries with 
skilled attendance and a maternal mortality ratio of 200 by 2007 (Jejeebhoy and Caleb Varkey 
2004: 75). More recently, the Congress-led central government has focused on creating 250,000 
Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) who would be integrated with existing health staff 
(especially ANMs or Auxiliary Nurse-Midwives) to provide ante-natal, intra-partum and post-
natal care (Dhar 2005; Rajalakshmi 2005).  
There is silence, however, on how adequate referral services for emergency cases will be 
guaranteed (Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 2005), and scant attention is paid to even 
monitoring the circumstances in which poor women living in rural UP—the majority of the 
female population of UP, let us remember—go through pregnancy and childbirth.  Briefly, 
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despite the rhetorical commitment to emergency obstetric care, women in rural Bijnor face just 
two options: home deliveries or costly urban deliveries.6 For several years, the ANM currently 
posted at Dharmnagri dispensary lived on the compound and provided some in-patient care 
(glucose drips, episiotomies). In the mid-1990s, she shifted to Bijnor town, where villagers 
allege she runs a small maternity clinic in her residence, from which she refers patients to private 
nursing homes if necessary. (She denies these allegations. As a government employee, she 
should neither practise privately nor refer patients to private facilities. She does take sterilisation 
‘cases’ to the government hospital, to ensure that her success in motivating family planning 
acceptors is recorded.) Because of duties in other villages in the locality, she is usually absent 
from the dispensary on several days each week. Nowadays, labouring women in Jhakri call 
Sabra, a trained dai resident in the village, whilst women in Dharmnagri rely on an untrained dai 
from another nearby village; few women have contact with either of these dais before the onset 
of labour, however.7  
Round-the-clock obstetric care through the state system is thus unavailable for women in 
Dharmnagri and Jhakri, and few deliveries approximate to the ideals enshrined in the 
Reproductive and Child Health programme. By the early 2000s, around 9 out of 10 births were 
still taking place in labouring women’s affinal homes, attended by their female affinal kin and a 
dai. Aside from Sabra in Jhakri, these women would not be regarded as ‘skilled’ attendants in 
policy discourse (or by most villagers). Neither would most of the local male practitioners who 
often make domiciliary visits to administer injections of synthetic oxytocin to augment labours 
                                                 
6 Generally, pregnancy is un-medicalised. Ante-natal monitoring usually comprises anti-tetanus injections 
administered by the ANM at Dharmnagri dispensary (which more women opt for now than in the early 1980s); a 
few women have ultrasound scans at private facilities, if they fear something is amiss. 
7 For more on Sabra, see Jeffery and Jeffery (1996: 259-73). 
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that women and their attendants judge to be progressing too slowly. At Rs 150-200 per injection, 
it seemingly provides a relatively cheap solution to an apparent obstetric impasse. Yet, between 
1997 and 2002, almost 1 in 5 of the deliveries that featured labour augmentation culminated in 
an emergency admission to a Bijnor nursing home, the journey generally made on a buffalo cart 
or a borrowed tractor-trolley.8 Indeed, there could have been more hospital deliveries, for several 
women gave birth en route to Bijnor. In the following two accounts—one from 1982 and one 
from 2003—both women had obstructed labours (Rajballa because of transverse presentation, 
Shanti because of cephalo-pelvic disproportion). Their cases highlight the calamitous potential of 
the obstetric crisis. 
 
V 
Rajballa and Rohtash9 
When Rohtash’s father died leaving six minor sons and a daughter, his older brother usurped 
some of his land. Consequently, in adulthood, Rohtash owned just over 0.6 hectares, whilst his 
uncle’s three sons each owned 2.4 hectares. When we first met Rohtash in early 1982, he was 
supplementing his income through daily wage labour at a small mill making unrefined sugar in 
the village. He was paid Rs 30 per day over the winter season of 7-8 months, which would have 
                                                 
8 We are not claiming a causal linkage between oxytocin injections and obstetric emergencies (complex deliveries 
requiring institutional care may be more likely candidates for injections). Nevertheless, administering oxytocin in 
conditions in which neither the dose nor the condition of the mother and foetus can be ascertained is contrary to 
international standards and is almost certainly unsafe. Between 1983 and 1987, labour augmentation was used in 
fewer than 15 per cent of the deliveries in Dharmnagri and Jhakri. By 2002, it was used in 48 per cent of deliveries. 
For more on this, see Jeffery et al. (2007); Pinto (2004: 351-53); Van Hollen (2003: 112-40). 
9 See Jeffery et al. (1989: 39-41 and 114-118) for more on Rajballa. 
    / PATRICIA JEFFERY AND ROGER JEFFERY 18  
yielded in the region of Rs 800 per month during the period he was employed.  At other seasons, 
his cash income was lower and more erratic, so his annual cash income from manual labour 
would have been in the region of Rs 7000-7500.10 
Several years earlier, an accident had left Rohtash blind in one eye and disfigured on one 
side of his face and no marriage offers came for him (unlike his brothers). Thus, in 1980, 
Rohtash bought Rajballa (along with her toddler daughter from an earlier union) from her brother 
for some Rs 800. She probably came from eastern UP—although no one knew for sure—and was 
constantly being taunted about her accent by Rohtash’s brothers and their wives. By April 1982, 
Rajballa was heavily pregnant and her ankles were badly swollen. When she was brought to the 
dispensary for a check-up, the ANM did an external examination and pronounced everything 
normal: she merely chided Rajballa for eating so much rice that it had created the swelling. A 
few days later, Rajballa was having a troubled labour at home. She had already drunk warm milk 
to ‘heat’ the contractions, but to no avail, so the dispensary compounder (pharmacist) was asked 
to administer an injection (an important component of his illegal private practice). Rajballa 
began experiencing rapid and strong contractions. Rohtash’s female kin roundly criticised her for 
making too much noise. Rohtash was even summoned at one point and he silenced her with a 
slap on the cheek. By midnight, the contractions had stopped, so the compounder was asked to 
administer another injection. Fearing that the baby was presenting transversely, Patricia asked 
him to examine Rajballa first. He confirmed the transverse presentation and agreed that Rajballa 
                                                 
10 It is notoriously difficult to assess rural incomes since they are so subject to seasonal variation. In western UP, 
there is scarcely any rural manual employment for some 2-3 months after the rice has been transplanted in late June, 
whilst demand for labour is higher from October to April when rice, sugarcane and wheat are being cultivated and 
harvested.  
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should be taken to the district government women’s hospital in Bijnor town. A couple of hours 
of discussion ensued. Rajballa’s in-laws resisted the pressures from one another to accompany 
her—voicing fear of the treatment that Rajballa and her attendants would receive, fear that she 
would die, and anxiety about the cost. Eventually, some neighbouring women agreed to 
accompany Rajballa. It was about 2 a.m. when we arrived. The night-duty nurses were angry at 
being disturbed and initially refused to do anything. Patricia insisted that Rajballa should be 
admitted—and one nurse (deceived by the dull lighting) commented, ‘These Punjabis even want 
treatments at night!’ Patricia pulled rank, and the doctor was called: she confirmed the transverse 
presentation and administered a muscle relaxant so that a caesarean could be performed later. By 
mid-morning a healthy son was delivered.  
During Rajballa’s stay in hospital, Rohtash and his relatives faced rudeness and 
humiliation, often in full view of other patients and their attendants, as did Rajballa herself. It 
was hard to persuade Rohtash’s relatives to remain at her bedside to ensure that medications 
were administered properly and punctually and that the area around the bed was cleaned. The 
whole episode also proved very costly for Rohtash. He had to pay out the equivalent of around 
two months of his annual cash income: over Rs 1000 to cover the registration fee, blood test, 
blood, glucose bottles and other medicines, as well as to bribe nursing and cleaning staff to 
perform their duties. Rohtash was not compelled to sell land however: he borrowed money from 
his sister’s husband, who took some of Rohtash’s land as surety. And if Rajballa had died, would 
he have reared Rajballa’s daughter alone or risked buying another wife who might mistreat the 
little girl? It could have been much worse, he told us later.  
 
VI 
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Shanti and Satish 
By 2003, Satish and Shanti had been married for over 8 years, and Shanti had had three 
miscarriages, two in early pregnancy and one of twins at five and a half months. Satish was the 
chaukidar (night-guard) for the largest farmer in Dharmnagri and was paid Rs 1300 per month 
throughout the year, with an evening meal in addition.11 He had also taken 0.4 hectares of land 
from this farmer on a sharecropping agreement that gave him just one third of the crop. The 0.25 
hectares acre of land that Satish owned was mortgaged against a loan of Rs 12,000 for earlier 
medical treatments, and he had still not fully repaid a loan for Rs 19,000 taken out at the time of 
his marriage.  
During Shanti’s pregnancy in 2003, she was having regular check-ups in town. A private 
doctor in Bijnor gave her monthly injections (each costing Rs 140) to prevent a miscarriage, and 
prescribed pills and tonics costing some Rs 400-500 per month. The doctor’s fees for each visit 
were Rs 100. Shanti also had an ultrasound test (costing Rs 300) to check the baby’s position. By 
mid-October, they had spent somewhere between Rs 4000 and Rs 5000. By mid-November, the 
doctor warned that the baby could not be born at home—but she did not explain why.  Satish still 
hoped there would be no more expense—and that was why, he explained after the birth in 
December, an entire night and day passed with Shanti in labour at home. Eventually, Satish 
requisitioned a neighbour’s tractor-trolley to take Shanti to town. The doctor she had consulted 
during pregnancy immediately referred her to another nursing home with operating facilities. 
Within half an hour of arrival, Mula was born by emergency caesarean. His head had become 
elongated during the labour—Shanti’s pelvis was too narrow for a vaginal birth—and the doctor 
had to mould his head into shape. Satish paid Rs 500 for the anaesthetic and another Rs 12,000 
                                                 
11 In 2003, daily wage labour rates in the village were Rs60-70, but without meals included. 
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later for the operation. Separately, he bought medicines costing some Rs 500 and paid around Rs 
800-900 to the nursing home staff (behind the doctor’s back).  
The doctor prepared a card detailing the place and time of birth, which Satish showed the 
village pandit (priest) when they discussed the baby’s naming ceremony (jasthaun). Far from an 
elective caesarean timed for the convenience of the mother, baby and doctor, Satish had 
unwittingly delayed Mula’s birth until the lunar asterism (nakshatr) called mul and that, too, on a 
Tuesday. The pandit explained that this was one of the most inauspicious times possible, and 
they would have to perform elaborate pujas (rituals) to reduce the evil influences. For the naming 
ceremony, the hawan and the meal for family and neighbours cost about Rs 9,000.  
The costs incurred during the pregnancy and delivery and for the jasthaun amounted to 
somewhere between Rs 25,000 and Rs 28,000. Shanti estimated that they had borrowed about Rs 
20,000. Clearly, Shanti’s medicalised pregnancy and the unfortunate timing of Mula’s birth 
added substantially to their outlays. The emergency obstetric care and subsequent nursing home 
stay alone cost about Rs 14,000, however, equivalent to around eight times Satish’s monthly pay. 
Shanti said that Satish sometimes teases her by saying that he has lost Rs 100,000 since his 
marriage—he, though, remains remarkably phlegmatic in the face of all these debts.  
 
VII 
From obstetric crisis to financial crisis 
In the early 2000s, some elderly women in Dharmnagri and Jhakri commented—with scornful 
exaggeration—that ‘all babies’ are being born in hospitals now because young women these days 
lack himmat (courage, stamina). Institutional deliveries have not become normalised, however, 
although they are more common. Significantly, the handful of women who actively sought 
    / PATRICIA JEFFERY AND ROGER JEFFERY 22  
admission to a nursing home at the onset of labour all lived in relatively wealthy village 
households. Otherwise, women’s accounts indicate that nursing home admissions are sought 
only after a woman has been in labour for a considerable time, with one or more injection 
administered in the hope that she would deliver at home. Women commented, ‘may God not 
compel anyone to see the door of a hospital’ or ‘without distress (taklif), who would go to 
hospital?’12 
Financial concerns are uppermost for many households. The outlays entailed in 
institutional deliveries compare very unfavourably with home deliveries: the dai’s fees 
(nowadays around Rs 400-500 depending on the baby’s sex) and injection(s) (another Rs 200 or 
so each), together total generally less than Rs 1000. At a nursing home, medical interventions 
and medicines cost several thousand rupees even in cases that do not need caesarean operations, 
supplemented by food costs for the woman and her attendants, transport costs, and any loss of 
income due to disrupted household routines. Money was crucial for Rohtash and Satish, who 
both (it should be noted) owned small amounts of land and were by no means the poorest men in 
the villages. Moreover, whilst our estimations should be read with caution, the cases of Rohtash 
and Satish suggest that land-poor households needed to raise higher proportions of their annual 
incomes to fund institutional deliveries in the early 2000s than in the early 1980s. Most of the 
other institutional deliveries created similar financial problems for the families involved. In 
Dharmnagri, for instance, Udayan’s daughter-in-law required an emergency caesarean to deliver 
twin girls in 1997. The operation cost Rs 10,000 and Rs 2000 went on other costs. The household 
                                                 
12 See Singh et al. (2004) for a discussion of factors that result in late referral of obstetric emergencies in 
Maharashtra (including non-recognition of obstetric problems by the labouring woman’s relatives, lack of cash and 
of transport, fear of poor quality treatment); see also George et al. (2005). 
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finances were already fragile because Udayan had been unable to work for several years. Indeed, 
his two sons’ incomes were being consumed by his medical expenses, and the younger son 
remained unmarried until he was nearly 30, because they could not provide a separate room for 
him. After the caesarean operation, they could raise the cash only by selling the young woman’s 
dowry jewellery, using a donation from her father, and taking a loan against sugarcane sales 
from another man in Dharmnagri. In Jhakri, the costs for Taranam’s emergency caesarean in 
1998 amounted to Rs 16,000—and, fearing this could happen again, Talib asked the doctor to 
sterilise Taranam.13 As one woman commented: 
Poor people don’t have enough money to feed themselves completely, so from where 
would we be able to show ourselves to a doctor? …. No, bhenna (sister), if a poor person 
gets food to eat that is a big thing. …. Whoever has money will fulfil their desires 
(shauq). And whoever doesn’t have money will kill their shauq [so that they no longer 
even want something]. The entire matter is one of money. 
Few village households have enough ready cash to fund even a brief hospital stay and 
health insurance is not part of villagers’ health care imaginaries. All payments for health care are 
out-of-pocket and people fear being unable to raise enough money quickly and without 
jeopardising household well-being. Formal bank loans take time to arrange, and require collateral 
(usually land), so they are unavailable to the poorest villagers. Moneylenders or pawnbrokers in 
Bijnor town lend quickly, but generally demand some valuables as surety and charge much 
higher rates of interest (nowadays Rs 10 per Rs 100 borrowed, per month).  In practice, kinfolk 
and neighbours are the major source of loans, usually but not always interest free, or even de 
facto gifts if provided by the labouring woman’s natal kin. Since Rajballa was a bought bride, 
                                                 
13 See Jeffery, et al. Forthcoming for a longer account of Talib and Taranam. 
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Rohtash could not draw on her kin, and was reduced to mortgaging land. More generally, the 
poor may fail to source enough cash from their equally poor relatives and must seek small sums 
from several sources: kin, employer, moneylender, sale of land, livestock or jewellery etc. As 
with Satish, indebtedness often pre-dates the medical emergency and he was compelled to 
increase his debts by borrowing several interest-bearing sums, as well as Rs 4,000 from his 
employer which was interest-free and would entail deductions of half his pay each month 
(although the following month Satish was paid nothing).  
Budgeting like this is typical of the kind of lives encompassed in the term jugar ki 
zindagi (an improvised life, a ‘make-do-and-mend’ life). As one woman put it, ‘there are many 
ways for the poor to die’—from lack of medical treatment or from the debts incurred by having 
it. Yet comments such as ‘money will return but a person will not’ and ‘you won’t remember the 
money if your patient survives’ capture people’s willingness to make outlays to save their 
patient’s life.  
 
VIII 
The (il)legitimacy of state provision 
Emergency obstetric care can precipitate serious financial worries, yet all but two of the 
institutional deliveries between 1993 and 2002 were in private urban facilities rather than the 
government hospital in Bijnor town. Villagers are also mindful of the care different institutions 
provide—and, given their commentaries on government facilities, the preference for private 
nursing homes is less puzzling.  
In 1982, there was little choice but to take emergencies to the government hospital in 
Bijnor town. Even then, medical care could not be obtained without payment. As Rajballa’s case 
Money itself discriminates / 25 
indicates, financial concerns jostled with fears about how she and Rohtash’s relatives would be 
treated by the government staff who were renowned for being rude, lazy and grasping.  Villagers 
still warm to the theme. Government employees are routinely alleged to be brusque, to humiliate 
poor, uneducated and rural patients loudly in public, to work carelessly and be inattentive to their 
duties, even in an emergency; government facilities are filthy and unkempt because cleaning 
staff are no more diligent than their medical superiors. Villagers say that government employees 
have no incentive to be polite, competent or hard-working, because they receive their salary each 
month, even if they see no patients or if patients are dissatisfied. In-patients and out-patients alike 
cannot expect free medicines: government staff are said to sell them to enhance their own 
incomes (a widespread allegation: cf. for example, Kozel and Parker 2002).  In-patients must 
make payments several times a day to doctors, nurses, cleaners and other staff who keep 
replacing one another in the duty rota. Otherwise, villagers say, nurses do not administer the 
correct drugs on time or check on intravenous drips, and cleaners do not clean the area around 
the patient’s bed. This expenditure is both unpredictable and extorted. Further, government 
doctors refer patients to private diagnostic facilities—pathology labs, ultrasound centres etc.—
and are alleged to take a cut of the fees charged to patients.14 In brief, villagers do not expect 
timely, competent, courteous or free treatment at government facilities. As one man put it, 
‘anyone who cares for their patient [ailing relative] will not take them to the government 
hospital’.  
 
IX 
Private practice as ‘business’ 
                                                 
14 Nandraj (1994: 1681) refers to this as ‘cut-practice’.  
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In comparison with other states, UP is not well served by not-for-profit or NGO-run health care 
facilities (Mishra 2005: 78). A few villagers with chronic ailments have gone to the Jolly Grant 
mission hospital, which provides free treatments to poor patients. But its location on the 
Haridwar and Dehra Dun road, nearly 100 km from Dharmnagri and Jhakri, makes it irrelevant 
for medical emergencies. Over the years, some villagers have obtained admission to a Delhi 
hospital where members of the landlord’s family are involved in the management. But treatment 
is costly and the distance (160 km) precludes emergency treatment. Most villagers, then, resort to 
locally-provided health care.  
Village practitioners, however, are considered capable of dealing only with ‘little 
illnesses’ (chhoti bimari, chhoti marz). They are sometimes dismissively termed fake (naqli, 
duplicate) or jhola chhap (referring to a cloth shoulder bag, a designation with fly-by-night 
connotations). Villagers believe that such practitioners learn their trade merely by working as a 
pharmacist beside a doctor and then setting up a kiosk from which to practise. Villagers are also 
scathing about the skills of the village dai (Jeffery, et al. 2002; Jeffery and Jeffery 1993). The 
knowledge (jankari) and equipment (ojar) of village practitioners and dais alike are quite 
inadequate to deal with emergencies, villagers say, and compare unfavourably to those in Bijnor 
town. Indeed, practitioners and dais withdraw from cases ‘beyond my capacity’ (meri bas ki 
nahin) to avoid responsibility for mishaps, and recommend that patients are taken to town. 
Childbirth is no exception.  
Doctors running private nursing homes generally seem to have formal biomedical 
qualifications, and they and their employees—nurses, compounders, sweepers and so forth—are 
said to speak courteously and gently to all their patients, to treat them kindly and display concern 
for their well-being, and to pay attention immediately if patients need something. As reported 
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elsewhere, payments in private facilities are higher than in state facilities (Mishra 2005: 74). 
According to Chakraborty (2002: Table 10.9), the charges range widely between different private 
institutions (from some Rs 5500 to Rs 25,000 for caesareans, for instance). Nevertheless, 
villagers consider the charges more predictable and less subject to extortion than in the 
government hospital.  Many private practitioners specify their fees at the outset, although even 
they do not always succeed in preventing their staff from requesting additional sums of money to 
perform their duties. 
Villagers, though, also regard the kindliness of private nursing home staff as an inevitable 
accompaniment of running a private business: rudeness and incompetence would have an 
adverse effect on ‘business’ (vyapari, a term used for market traders, merchants etc.). Private 
practitioners are always mindful of their reputation, villagers say, for practitioners who treat 
patients badly would not be recommended to others: practitioners are interested in making 
money—and so will not turn away someone who can pay for treatment. When Patricia asked one 
woman if private doctors discriminate against different kinds of patients—low castes, Muslims, 
villagers—her reply was ‘money itself discriminates’, and that private practitioners do not mind 
what kind of patients come, provided they pay the medical charges in full. Some rural 
practitioners are said to accept payment in instalments—but urban private practitioners are liable 
to prevent patients from going home until their relatives pay the entire bill. One woman likened 
the private nursing home to a jail, where you silently do just what the doctor tells you for fear 
that you might be given some medication to cause further health problems. Sometimes, patients 
might be able to use contacts and recommendations (sifarish) to obtain a fee concession—but 
generally patients expect to pay the entire sum specified.  
Consonant with the view of private medical care as business, some villagers claim that 
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private practitioners cultivate rural practitioners to whom they pay ‘commission’ when they 
bring patients to the nursing home. One labouring woman, for instance, wanted to go to a 
particular nursing home in Bijnor, but a village practitioner took her to another one—and he was 
reputed to have received Rs 5000 of the fees her relatives paid there. Village women also claim 
that the current ANM at the Dharmnagri dispensary is also rewarded with ‘commission’ when 
she refers labouring women to private nursing homes. In addition, private nursing homes 
generally have ‘stores’ (pharmacies) on the premises, and villagers say that staff insist on seeing 
the receipts for medicines, to ensure that they have not been bought more cheaply elsewhere.  
Some villagers say that private doctors treat patients to the best of their ability according 
to what they understand to be medically necessary. But others allege that private doctors 
manipulate people’s anxieties and gullibility to persuade them to accept expensive but 
unnecessary diagnostic tests or treatments, for instance, pressurising people into agreeing to 
caesareans rather than waiting to see if a vaginal delivery is possible. Moreover, villagers realise 
that clear divisions between state and private health care cannot be drawn in practice. Not only 
do government doctors refer patients to private diagnostic services, but many themselves run 
private practices from clinics or from their own homes. And, tellingly, villagers commented on 
how the self-same curt and lazy government doctor becomes charming and diligent when 
consulted in a private capacity.  
 
X 
Conclusion 
Our Bijnor material, then, shows how—insidiously, partially but inexorably—villagers are being 
confronted with processes of social change that affect the terms under which they negotiate 
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access to health care. In this paper, we have focused on obstetric care—but many of the points 
we have made apply more generally to villagers’ health care seeking (with the caveat that people 
usually engage in more ‘shopping around’ for treatments for chronic ailments). Here we want to 
highlight some implications of these developments: first, the expansion of private medical 
practice when there is widespread poverty and the state fails to provide a ‘safety-net’; second, the 
regulation of the health care market, when the state’s capacity has been systematically 
undermined, and citizens are neither competent nor powerful enough to monitor health care 
provision; third, how these considerations play out in relation to the moral authority of the state. 
Citing NSS data from 1986-7, Krishnan argues that there was less market demand for 
private medical care in UP than in other states and that the poor were more reliant than elsewhere 
on the state sector, despite its serious inadequacies and even though state health care was not free 
(Krishnan 1999). Further, evidence from around the country suggests that where state-funded 
health care provision is particularly poor, private practitioners enter the market on favourable 
terms and their charges are greater than where the state system works adequately (Sen et al. 
2002: 289). In UP, the retrenchment in the state sector hits the poorest people particularly hard, 
because there is no effective safety net. Thus villagers have been increasingly drawn into the 
ambit of privately-provided biomedicine, but on terms that conjure up the spectre of distress 
sales of valuables, greater indebtedness, or even inability to seek health care at all. The potential 
slide into financial ruin is by no means unique to UP. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative 
data from Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, a recent World Bank report suggests that illness is 
a major cause of poverty, not only because of the sick person’s loss of earnings but also because 
of the costs of treatment, whether in public or private facilities (Peters et al. 2002). Similarly, 
Krishna’s data from Andhra Pradesh and elsewhere show that a major reason why families fall 
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into poverty is the cost of emergency medical care (Krishna 2006). As Mishra puts it, ‘the rural 
population has no option but to rely on quacks and the fee-for-service private sector leading to 
sickness-triggered indebtedness’ (Mishra 2005:76).  
Beyond this, the advocates of reform trumpet the supposed efficiency of market forces 
and the benefits of consumer choice, but this serves to legitimise the exclusion of the poor and to 
mask how ‘quite systematically, these reforms have been deeply unequalizing’ (Freedman et al. 
2005: 96; see also 39-41, 95-97; Harriss-White 1999). The market does not guarantee equality of 
access to health care (Jesani 2003), but results in ‘marginalizing the poor and increasing 
accumulation and consumption by the rich’ (Qadeer et al. 2001b: 31; see also Sen 2001). For 
Petchesky, economic justice is at stake (Petchesky 2003:59-60): 
[when] the market becomes the source of most services for most people; and those who 
cannot afford to pay (‘the most vulnerable’) are left to be protected by (often nonexistent) 
‘safety nets.’ In other words, health care becomes essentially a two-tier system: a 
commodity for many (‘health consumers’) and a form of ‘public assistance’—or an 
unattainable luxury—for the rest. (Petchesky 2000: 31-32) 
These processes are unlikely to be reversed in the foreseeable future because the middle classes 
tend to benefit from them more than they suffer. Most directly, of course, institutional deliveries 
in private nursing homes and other kinds of private health care provisions entail a transfer of 
resources from the rural areas into the pockets of (some sectors of) the urban middle classes, 
what Jesani terms the ‘medical business class’ (Jesani 2003: 212). The entrepreneurial citizen, 
then, is making choices—but doing so in an environment that often undermines household 
wellbeing and solvency, and that (in the longer run) may result in the decline of the small 
peasantry in particular. 
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Second, people’s willingness to pay for health care even prior to liberalisation was read 
by those advocating reforms as an indication that the state health sector’s failings could best be 
remedied by expanding the market. Certainly, state provision was not beyond criticism, but the 
leap of faith entailed in embracing the market was misplaced. Under liberalisation, the state’s 
capacity to act as a safety net for the poor was compromised by budgetary cuts, but so, too, was 
its ability to exercise the governance and surveillance functions that the World Bank and others 
required of it. Perhaps the belief that the proverbial ‘invisible hand’ would guarantee a high 
quality and competitive market in health care engendered complacency amongst proponents of 
liberalisation (although Manmohan Singh was perhaps not so sanguine). Critics, however, 
consider there is scant evidence of market efficiency in the health sector—rather they emphasise 
the undesirable consequences of encouraging privatisation without ensuring public 
accountability (Freedman et al. 2005: 96-97; Mishra 2005:81; Petchesky 2003: 59; Sen 2001). 
Even sympathisers such as Chakraborty recognise that appropriate quality assurance mechanisms 
are not in place (Chakraborty 2002: 274). 
We should perhaps not be surprised that monitoring the market is beyond the state’s 
grasp, given the history of its attempts to regulate even its own employees, and that legislation to 
regulate the public health sector is notable for its absence (Jesani 2003: 212). On various 
occasions since 1947, for instance, the government has attempted to prevent its employees from 
engaging in private practice, only to be met by protests and the haemorrhaging of doctors into 
the private sector (Baru 1998: 50; Jeffery 1988: 183-86). Chakraborty also points to the 
considerable power of private practitioners because of their dominance of health care in 
contemporary India (Chakraborty 2002: 274). In rural Bijnor, private practitioners—often 
untrained, generally unregistered—reputedly work with no more serious restraint than the hush 
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money they pay to government officials. In Bijnor town, most nursing homes offering obstetric 
services lack facilities crucial for dealing with emergencies (such as blood, oxygen, resident 
anaesthetist and neo-natal resuscitation equipment or incubators), and they are by no means 
unusual in that (Jesani 2003: 214). Villagers’ allegations that private doctors advise excessive 
and/or unsuitable medications or unnecessary diagnostic tests are echoed in evidence from 
elsewhere in India (Nandraj 1994; Parikh and Radhakrishna 2005: 7; Phadke 2001; Sen et al. 
2002: 296; Sen Gupta 1999: 149-50). Caesarean rates are higher in private institutions than in 
government facilities (Jejeebhoy and Caleb Varkey 2004: 55; Mishra 2005: 74) and, as Pai 
comments, unnecessary caesarean operations may become a fad for middle class women, but 
unaffordable for poor and rural women who need them (Pai 2000: 2760). 
The private sector’s deficiencies are all the more lamentable because most of their 
‘customers’ cannot be autonomous consumers determining their own needs: rather, patients are 
insufficiently informed about the requirements of good medical care or the failings of particular 
practitioners and they are vulnerable to ‘supplier-induced demand’ (Jesani 2003: 213). Patients 
and their relatives do not constitute a sufficiently powerful lobby to protect patients’ interests. 
Indeed the very idea that people should regulate the health care market by ‘shopping around’, 
particularly when dealing with a medical emergency, is as unrealistic as it is inhumane. Further, 
at least in western UP, neither civil society organisations nor panchayat health committees have 
the capacity to hold the health sector to account.  
Third, Freedman et al. suggest that these kinds of processes de-legitimate the state 
(Freedman et al. 2005: 96-97), or, as we would prefer for India, further de-legitimate. Time and 
again throughout the years we have been working in rural Bijnor, people have insisted that the 
state should be responsible for providing services for the populace in general, and should be just, 
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efficient and humanitarian in its provision, whether in relation to childbearing or schooling, 
policing or general development work. The state-as-idea, then, retains considerable legitimacy 
(see also Hansen 2000; Lieten 2003). But the state-as-provider has never lived up to these ideals. 
Even before the time of liberalisation, there was nothing remotely approaching full welfare 
provision. Few villagers think they can alter the state’s functioning at the local level, but this 
does not silence their resentment about the absence of free services for the poor and about health 
care provision that serves well only the relatively wealthy or those with contacts and influence. 
They hold the state health provision in low estimation and see it as a fine exemplar of the woeful 
faults that riddle government services in general.  For many years, too, the state’s legitimacy has 
also been undercut by the coercive dimensions of the state-as-regulator. Villagers mistrust the 
state and are wary of its intrusion into their lives. For instance, villagers’ views of family 
planning have been coloured by the coercive practices that abounded during the Emergency of 
1975-7; through most of the period since, incentives to staff have continued to encourage robust 
efforts to motivate villagers to become family planning ‘cases’. Similarly, the current repeated 
rounds of the ‘Pulse Polio’ programme have put pressures on staff to achieve immunisation 
targets that have resulted in forceful responses to villagers’ resistance (Coutinho et al. 2000; 
Drèze and Sen 2002: 208-13; Jeffery and Jeffery 2006: 108 ff.; Jeffery et al. 1989: 200 ff.; Pinto 
2004: 339).  
Villagers have grasped the hollowness of government claims to be concerned about 
people like them. But the legitimacy of the health care market is ambiguous, partial, and 
contested too. Both are riddled with systemic incapacities. Neither the state nor the market can 
guarantee a functioning referral system for obstetric emergencies (or, indeed, other health 
problems requiring solution beyond the primary health care level). Based on their work in West 
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Bengal, Bihar and Jharkhand, Corbridge et al. argue that Employment Assurance Schemes and 
primary education open up some spaces of empowerment for the poor in their dealings with the 
state (Corbridge et al. 2005: 219, 246-9). In the field of health care, however, contemporaneous 
changes—reductions in state provision, expansion of non-state provision—have worked to 
disempower the rural poor, whilst also widening income-generating opportunities for some 
members of the urban professional classes. In effect, poor villagers have rights neither in the 
state nor in the market. Sadly, despite the iconic status of maternal mortality, ongoing changes in 
the economy and the state provide little prospect of ameliorating the birthing experiences of 
women in rural UP—and rural women experiencing obstetric emergencies remain caught 
between a moribund state and a rapacious market that is readily accessible only to those who can 
pay. 
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